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A considerable literature has examined the causes, consequences, and policy responses to surges in
international capital flows. A related strand of papers has attempted to catalog current account reversals
and capital account "sudden stops." This paper offers an encompassing approach with an algorithm
cataloging capital inflow bonanzas in both advanced and emerging economies during 1980-2007 for
181 countries and 1960-2007 for a subset of 66 economies from all regions. In line with earlier studies,
global factors, such as commodity prices, international interest rates, and growth in the world's largest
economies, have a systematic effect on the global capital flow cycle. Bonanzas are no blessing for
advanced or emerging market economies. In the case of the latter, capital inflow bonanzas are associated
with a higher likelihood of economic crises (debt defaults, banking, inflation and currency crashes).
Bonanzas in developing countries are associated with procyclical fiscal policies and attempts to curb or
avoid an exchange rate appreciation -- very likely contributing to economic vulnerability. For the advanced
economies, the results are not as stark, but bonanzas are associated with more volatile macroeconomic
outcomes for GDP growth, inflation, and the external accounts. Slower economic growth and sustained
declines in equity and housing prices follow at the end of the inflow episode.
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A pattern has often been repeated in the modern era of global finance.  Foreign 
investors turn with interest toward some developing country.  Capital flows in volume 
into small and shallow local financial markets.  The exchange rate tends to appreciate, 
asset prices to rally, and local commodity prices to boom.  These favorable asset price 
movements improve national fiscal indicators and encourage domestic credit expansion.  
These, in turn, exacerbate structural weaknesses in the domestic banking sector even as 
those local institutions are courted by global financial institutions seeking entry into a hot 
market.  At the same time, local authorities resort to large-scale foreign exchange sales of 
the local currency to cushion the effects on the exchange rate of the capital inflow 
bonanza.   
Other policy interventions, such as increases in reserve requirements and 
transactions taxes, usually follow to insulate the domestic economy from the 
accumulation of reserves.  An inherent tension emerges:  Local authorities take such 
changes as a global vote of approval that might encourage them to delay the difficult task 
of structural adjustment.   
This pattern is etched sharply in the experience of the ERM, the ERM2, and the 
Latin convergence associated with NAFTA and its regional successors.  In the run-up to a 
more perfect union, potential entrants are increasingly looked upon favorably by global 
investors.  Those investors appreciate that close integration with a strong anchor country 
or group of countries will ultimately discipline policymakers in the periphery, which will 
narrow exchange rate fluctuations and country risk spreads and buoy local equity prices.  
But these same dynamics also play out in commodity-exporting emerging market   2
economies when the prices of their output surge on world markets or when very low 
interest rates and sluggish growth in the advanced countries turn the attention of investors 
there outward.  Across countries, a different rising tide raises all boats.   
 But tides also go out when the fancy of global investors shifts and the “new 
paradigm” looks shop worn.  Flows reverse and asset prices give back their gains, often 
forcing a painful adjustment on the economy.   
This experience has provided a fertile testing ground for international economists.   
A varied flora has blossomed that will be reviewed in Section 2.  Given double-entry 
bookkeeping and the zero-sum nature of global trade, these issues of global adjustment 
have been described in terms of the current or financial accounts and as deterioration in 
some countries or improvement in others.   Moreover, the time windows have been 
chosen to isolate the build-up or run-down of any of these measures.   
This paper attempts to be encompassing in its examination of these issues by 
simplifying the definition of the key event that is studied and by widening the time 
window around that event.  We investigate what happens before, during, and after a 
capital flow bonanza.  That is, we ask how do economies perform in and around periods 
when capital inflows are relatively large (or, equivalently, when their financial account 
surpluses are relatively large)?  Due to data limitations discussed below, we make this 
operational by examining episodes of large current account deficits. 
We study 181 countries from 1980 to 2007, a subset of 66 countries from 1960 to 
2007 for which more detailed information on economic variables is available, and a 
smaller group of 18 countries for which house price data are available; the samples 
include all regions and income groups.  Our primary aim is to quantitatively define and   3
date capital inflow bonanza episodes, so as to study their various aspects.  In Section 3, 
we document several features of these bonanza periods, including their incidence and 
duration.  In Section 4, we examine the evidence on potential links between capital flow 
bonanzas and debt, currency, inflation, and banking crises.  In Section 5, we 
systematically illustrate the behavior of a variety of macroeconomic, financial, and policy 
indicators on the eve and aftermath of these episodes. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: 
With nearly fifty years of data, it is evident that bonanzas have become more 
frequent as restrictions on international capital flows have been relaxed worldwide.  
Although the approaches differ, this finding is in line with the evidence presented in 
Eichengreen and Adalet (2005). 
The heavy inflow episode can persist, often lulling policymakers and investors 
into treating the bonanza as a permanent phenomenon rather than a temporary shock.  
Episodes end, more often than not, with an abrupt reversal or “sudden stop” à la Calvo 
(as in Calvo, 1998).   The current account path around bonanzas is distinctly V-shaped, 
irrespective of whether the broader, but more recent, sample or the less inclusive, but 
longer, sample is the benchmark. 
Capital inflow bonanza periods are associated with a higher incidence of banking, 
currency, and inflation crises in all but the high income countries (using some of the 
crises indicators developed in Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, and codified in Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2008a). This result is not the artifact of a few extreme cases; in more than 60 
percent of the countries, the probability of a crisis around the dates of a capital flow   4
bonanza is higher than for the entire sample.  Capital flow bonanzas systematically 
precede sovereign default episodes. 
In developing countries (those designated by the World Bank as middle and low 
income), the stance of fiscal policy, as measured by the growth in real government 
spending, is notoriously procyclical during capital inflow bonanzas.  This is consistent 
with the earlier observation that temporary “good times” are often treated as permanent.  
In effect, our preliminary results also suggest that fiscal policy plays a destabilizing role 
around capital flow bonanzas—and possibly more generally. 
For the advanced economies, the results are not as stark, as there is no systematic 
cross-country evidence over 1960-2007 that the probability of a financial crisis increases 
during bouts of heavy capital inflows.  The crisis-prone Nordic countries in the early 
1990s and the Iceland, U.K., and U.S. crises at present would appear to be important 
departures from this general result (as in Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008b).   Nonetheless, 
capital flow bonanzas are associated with more volatile macroeconomic outcomes for 
real GDP growth, inflation, and the external accounts. 
Real GDP growth tends to be higher in the run-up to a bonanza and then 
systematically lower.  The imprint of bonanzas is evident in asset markets.  Equity prices 
rise when capital flows in and retreat when capital flows out.  A similar pattern is evident 
in house prices for our small sample.  A bonanza is not to be confused with a blessing. 
The last section turns to some of the policy implications of our analysis and 
discusses possible future research in this area. 
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2. Concepts and Data Issues 
1.  Reviewing the existing literature 
The existing literature has studied multiple manifestations of international 
adjustment in the balance-of-payments data.  Double-entry bookkeeping and the global 
summing to zero of trade flows produces the four alternative frames of reference laid out 
in Table 1.  The main issues of adjustment can be described in terms of either an 
improvement or deterioration (along the rows of the matrix) in either the current or 
capital accounts (along the columns). 
Table 1.  Frames of reference in the literature 
 
    Balance-of-payments account 
Change:    Current account  Capital account 

















There is a rich empirical literature on current account reversals, the upper left cell, 
mostly documenting the macroeconomic consequences of a marked improvement in a 
sample of many countries.  Many features of these studies follow the path laid out in the 
pioneering paper by Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin (2000).  As summarized 
in Table 2, they established three criteria to identify a current account reversal that are 
now the norm:  The change in the balance must be large relative to nominal GDP, large 
absolutely in dollar terms, and not the product of a spike in a single year.  Focusing on 
low- and middle-income countries, they find that the adjustment experience is   6
heterogeneous and depends importantly on whether the currency crashes on the foreign 
exchange market. 
Table 2. Current and capital account reversals:  Some definitions 
Study 
 




Milesi-Ferreti and Razin 
(2000). Also 
Edwards (2005), 
Eichengreen and Adalet 
(2005), and Freund and 
Warnock (2005) 
Their underlying idea is that “large” events provide more information on 
determinants of reductions in current-account deficits than short-run 
fluctuations. These events have to satisfy three requirements: 
1)  An average reduction in the current account deficit of at least 3 (or 5) 
percentage points of GDP over a period of three years with respect to the three 
years before the event; 
2)  The maximum deficit after the reversal must be no larger than the minimum 
deficit in the three years preceding the reversal; 
3) The average current account deficit must be reduced by at least one third. 
The first and second requirements should ensure that we capture only 
reductions of sustained current account deficits, rather than sharp but 
temporary reversals. The third requirement is necessary so as to avoid counting 
as a reversal a reduction in the current account deficit from, say, 15 to 12 




Calvo, Izquierdo, and 
Mejia (2004) 
 A Sudden Stop is defined as a phase that meets the following conditions: 
1) It contains at least one observation where the year-on-year fall in capital 
flows lies at least two standard deviations below its sample mean (this 
addresses the“unexpected” requirement of a Sudden Stop). 
2) The Sudden Stop phase ends once the annual change in capital flows 
exceeds one standard deviation below its sample mean. This will generally 
introduce persistence, a common fact of Sudden Stops. 
3) Moreover, for the sake of symmetry, the start of a Sudden Stop phase is 
determined by the first time the annual change in capital flows falls one 




Calvo, Izquierdo, and 
Loo-Kung (2006) or CIL 
1) In addition to the criterion of large capital flow reversals exceeding two 
standard deviations from the mean (for their capital flow proxy), CIL require 
that  
2) these reversals be accompanied by a spike in some external aggregate 
measure of the cost of funds in order to capture systemic effects. More 
specifically, CIL uses the (log of) J. P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index 
(EMBI) spread over US Treasury bonds for EMs, the Merrill Lynch Euro-area 
Government Index spreads for Euro-area countries (as well as Nordic countries 
such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), and G7 Government Index spreads 
for all remaining developed countries. CIL construct aggregate high-spread 
episodes in analogous fashion to the Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) 
measure of large capital flow reversals (i.e., CIL consider spikes in spreads 
exceeding two standard deviations from the mean), and that a Sudden Stop 
occurs when the measure of the fall-in-capital-flows phase overlaps (on a 
yearly basis) with the aggregate high-spread phase. Episodes that lie within a 
six-month interval are considered part of the same Sudden Stop phase. 
 
Barry Eichengreen and Muge Adalet (2005) extended the sample to include the 
pre-1970 experience, thereby providing historical context.  In particular, large current   7
account reversals appear to be the product of open trade in goods, services, and assets.  
Reversals have only been frequent in the two heydays of global capital markets—the 
recent period and the 1920s and 1930s.  Large adjustments were much rarer under the 
pre-World-War I gold standard and during the Bretton Woods years. 
An important fuel to the study of current account reversals has been the U.S. 
experience of sustained large deficits.  The intent is to find rules of thumb that will be 
informative about the U.S. experience when the presumed “day of reckoning” comes and 
the unsustainable is no longer sustained.   The search for such lessons appears in 
important papers by Sebastian Edwards (2005 and 2007) and Caroline Freund and Frank 
Warnock (2005).  They find an important role for the textbook forces thought to rein in a 
current account imbalance—a slowing in income growth and a real depreciation of the 
currency.  
Similar interest in the U.S. experience produced work in the 1980s on why the 
current account deteriorated, which is the subject of the lower left cell of Table 1.  The 
main culprit at that time was identified to be the large budget deficit, which through 
national income accounting was mirrored in its twin, the current account.  
Contemporaneous discussions of this can be found in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City (1985) and a later review has been provided by Bosworth (1993).  This line of 
argument petered out in the late 1990s when the U.S. federal budget went into surplus but 
the current account remained deeply in red.    
Those researchers focusing on the right cells of the contingency table typically 
take the perspective of emerging market economies.  In particular, they view the portfolio 
investment decisions of investors at the center of the global financial system as somewhat   8
fickle.  Assets in some emerging markets may be in fashion for a time.  Those inflows 
tend to appreciate the exchange rate, lead to reserve accumulation as authorities attempt 
to offset that force, and push up prices in asset markets.  Altogether, this presents a 
“capital inflow problem” as described by Guillermo Calvo, Leo Leiderman, and Carmen 
Reinhart (1993), an issue also studied by Eduardo Fernandez-Arias and Peter Montiel 
(1996). 
When capital no longer flows into an emerging market, the nation can no longer 
support an excess of spending over income.  The result, in the phrase of Guillermo Calvo 
and his coauthors, is a “sudden stop,” forcing current account adjustment.  The empirical 
application of this insight can be found in Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) and Calvo, 
Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung (2006), both of which are described in more detail in Table 2. 
2. Defining a capital flow bonanza 
  The decision to adopt a particular algorithm to date and catalog capital inflow 
bonanzas naturally involves tradeoffs.  An advantage of casting our net wide to all large 
capital inflow episodes is that it does not predispose us to episodes that inevitably ended 
in a marked reversal.  In this sense, there is a lower predisposition to tilt the analysis 
toward economic crises. An inflow bonanza can end with a bang or with a whimper.  In 
this sense, our approach parallels the analysis of Goldfajn and Valdes (1999), who rather 
than starting their analysis with currency crises dates, began by documenting episodes of 
cumulative real exchange rate appreciations of varying degrees and then sorted out which   9
episodes unwound through an abrupt nominal exchange rate crash and which did so 
through reductions in inflation versus their trading partners. 
1 
  We began with the presumption that the best indicator of capital flows would be 
reserve accumulation less the current account balance, as it measures the resources 
acquired (or dispersed) through issuance (or retirement) of home country liabilities.  This 
indirect measurement of the change in liabilities seemed more likely to be available for a 
longer time span and for more countries than direct information from financial accounts. 
In the event, data on reserves tends to be published only on a delayed basis in many 
countries.  To keep our efforts topical, the current account balance as a percent of GDP is 
our benchmark indicator.  It is measured more consistently across time and international 
boundaries than its capital account and financial account counterpart.
2   For the more 
recent period, the same filter rules are applied to the other measures as a robustness check 
as is reported in an appendix. 
We began by applying the three-step approach proposed by Milesi-Ferreti and 
Razin to our data set with a suitable revision that does not enforce a current account 
reversal.  This approach, however, raised some issues about dating the bonanzas of many 
well-known episodes.  In some countries where the deterioration in the current account 
(and hence the rise in capital inflows) was a relatively smooth process over several years, 
this algorithm did not flag these episodes as bonanzas even though the current account 
deficits were large by historical standards.  Heavy inflow cases, such as the United States 
                                                 
1 Gourinchas et. al. (2001) perform a similar exercise to assess which credit booms end in crises and credit 
crunches and which do not. Edwards (2004) is particularly careful in trying to consider both abrupt 
reversals and more gradual adjustment. 
2 We would also like to thank Gian Maria Milesi-Ferreti for pointing out the financial account figures have 
to be interpreted with care during years in which there is debt forgiveness, which show up as large debt 
repayments (i.e., capital outflows).   10
since 2004 and Australia in several cycles since 1960, were missed altogether.  In other 
cases, the inflow bonanza persisted after the peak current account deficit had been 
reached.  For instance, the Thai and Malaysian current account deficits peaked in the 
early 1990s; however, while the deficits remained large by historical standards well into 
1996, these years are not classified as bonanzas by this algorithm.  Many of the important 
(but less persistent) surges in capital inflows of the late 1970s and early 1980s also go 
undetected.   
We ultimately settled on an alternative algorithm that provided uniform treatment 
across countries but was flexible enough to allow for significant cross-country variation 
in the current account.  As in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), we select a threshold to 
define bonanzas that is common across countries (in this case the 20
th percentile).
3  This 
threshold included most of the better known episodes in the literature but was not so 
inclusive as to label a bonanza more “routine” deteriorations in the current account.  
Because the underlying frequency distributions vary widely across countries, the 
common threshold produces quite disperse country-specific cutoffs.  For instance, in the 
case of relatively closed India, the cutoff to define a bonanza is a current account 
deficit/GDP in excess of 1.8 percent, while for trade-oriented Malaysia the comparable 
cutoff is a deficit/GDP ratio of 6.6 percent. 
4 
Figure 1, which plots the frequency distribution for 181 countries, highlights these 
differences both across countries and major income groups.   As the figure makes clear,  
                                                 
3 We also impose a non-negativity constraint, so countries that are capital exporters throughout the sample 
never record a bonanza. 
4  The interested reader is referred to Appendix Figure 2, which provides a comparison among three 






















































the range of experience is wide, but large deficits appear more frequently in lower-
income countries. 
3. Sample coverage and data 
We employ three samples to analyze the capital bonanza phenomenon.  The 
broadest sample includes the 181 countries covered in the International Monetary Fund’s 
World Economic Outlook for 1980 through 2007. Information is available on the current 
account, real GDP, inflation, and the real exchange rate.  This allows us to examine the 
recent country experiences in a truly global setting.     12
We will refer to the second dataset as the “core” sample, which spans 1960 
through 2007 and covers 64 countries across all regions.  This sample is dominated by 
high- and middle-income countries, where data availability poses less of a constraint.  It 
is for this sample that we are able to examine in greater depth the macroeconomic 
features of the bonanzas.  Also, for the core countries, we have a sufficiently complete 
dating of economic crises (debt, banking, etc.) that allow us to assess whether a capital 
inflow bonanza predisposes countries to financial crises.   
The third set is a small sample of eighteen industrial countries for which we have 
data on house prices from the Bank for International Settlements.  Otherwise, the data 
coverage for this group is the same as the core group.  Appendix Tables 1 and 2 list the 
countries (and the income group they belong to) that make up the three samples. 
5 
All data are annual.  In addition to including time series on the current account, 
capital and financial accounts, and nominal GDP (all in US dollars), we employ a variety 
of macroeconomic times series.  These include country-specific variables: international 
reserves, nominal and real exchange rates, real GDP, consumer prices, export, imports, 
government expenditure, revenue, and deficits, equity, and (in the case of some advanced 
economies) real estate prices.  In addition, we have dichotomous variables that date 
external debt crises, currency crashes, and inflation and banking crises.  Global variables, 
such as commodity prices, international interest rates, growth in the world’s largest 
economies, measures of macroeconomic volatility, and the global incidence of  capital 
flow bonanzas and various “types” of economic crises, round out the analysis.  Appendix 
Table 3 provides a full list of the variables as well as their respective sources. 
                                                 
5 The income group classification is that provided by the World Bank.   13
The availability of long time series on various aspects of macroeconomic 
performance was important in deciding on the design principle of our key indicator—a 
capital flow bonanza.  Because we had gathered a sufficiently rich dataset, we could be 
somewhat general in defining events, because we will be able to characterize behavior in 
a wide window around those events.  That is, we can see the run-up and the wind-down 
in a manner that encompasses the definitions of earlier work. 
3. Capital Flow Bonanzas:  Global Cycles and Country Episodes 
  In what follows, we provide a sketch of country-specific and global capital flow 
cycles, including: incidence, by region and income group; duration; and links to global 
indicators. 
1. The big picture 
It is relatively well known that international capital flows have an important 
cyclical component.
6  The fact that capital (contrary to the predictions of the neoclassical 
growth paradigm) does not flow from rich to poor countries has also received 
considerable attention. 
7  Both of these stylized facts are illustrated in the two panels of 
Figure 2, which plot the incidence (i.e. the percent of countries) of capital inflow 
bonanzas for the broad sample consisting of 181 countries.  The specific dates of the 
bonanza episodes on a country-by-country basis are listed in the four-part Appendix 




                                                 
6 See, for example, Sarno and Taylor (1999), who, using standard time series techniques, decompose the 
various components of international capital flows into their permanent and transitory components. 
7 Lucas (1990) suggested human capital differentials might account for this “paradox,” while Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) and Alfaro, et.al. (2008) point to the high incidence of sovereign default and weak 
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Table 3. Dates of capital flow bonanzas: 
Core sample, high and middle-high income, 1960-2007 
                 
Country  Years of Bonanzas   
              
High Income, OECD         
Australia  1965,1986, 1989, 2004-2005, 2007     
Austria  1972-1974, 1976-1977, 1979-1981, 1995-1997, 1999 
Belgium 1967-1968,  1975-1984       
Canada 1975-1979,  1981,  1989-1993     
Denmark  1969-1970, 1974-1977, 1979, 1981-1982, 1984-1987 
Finland 1975-1976,  1980,  1988-1992     
France  1966-1967, 1969, 1974, 1976, 1982-1983, 2005-2007 
Germany  1980, 1991, 1994-1995, 1999-2000   
Greece 1983,  1985,  2000, 2006-2007     
Italy  1974, 1980-1982, 1991-1992     
Korea 1980-1983,  1991,  1996     
New Zealand  1974-1975, 1982, 1984-1985, 2005-2007   
Norway 1974-1979,  1986-1989,  1998     
Portugal 1981-1982,  2000-2001,  2005     
Spain  1965-1966, 1974, 1976, 2000, 2004-2007   
Sweden 1976-1977,  1979-1982,  1990-1992     
United Kingdom  1960-1976, 1988-1990, 2005-2007     
United States  2002-2007         
High Income, Non-OECD      
Hong Kong SAR  1980-1981, 1994-1997       
Singapore 1980-1984,  1987       
Middle- income, high          
Argentina  1982, 1987, 1994, 1997-1999     
Brazil 1974-1983,  1999,  2001     
Chile  1978, 1980-1982, 1984-1986,     
Costa Rica  1970-1983, 1989-1990       
Hungary  1986-1987, 1993-1994, 1998-1999, 2003-2004   
Malaysia 1981-1983,  1991,  1994-1995     
Mauritius 1979-1982,  2006-2007       
Mexico 1974-1976,  1979-1981,  1991-1994     
Panama  1967-1973, 1975-1982, 1997-1998, 2007   
Poland 1980-1981,  1985-1989       
Romania 1992,  2004-2007       
Russia 1992,  1997       
South Africa  1981-1982, 2005-2007       
Turkey   1977, 1980, 2000, 2004-2007     
Uruguay 1980-1984,  2001       
Venezuela  1967, 1977-1978, 1982, 1987-1988, 1992-1993, 1998 
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Table 3 (concluded). Dates of capital flow bonanzas: 
Core sample, middle-low and low income, 1960-2007 
                 
Country  Years of Bonanzas 
                 
Middle-income, low          
Algeria  1969, 1973, 1975-1979, 1986, 1988-1989, 1994-1995, 1998 
Angola  1982, 1995, 1997-1999, 2001     
Bolivia  1978-1979, 1981, 1985-1987, 1993, 1998   
China  1979, 1985-1986, 1988-1989, 1993   
Colombia  1971, 1982-1983, 1995, 1997-1998   
Dominican Republic  1966-1970,1972-1973, 1975-1982, 1987   
Ecuador  1978, 1981-1982, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1998   
Egypt  1967-1971, 1974-1976, 1979, 1981-1985, 1998 
El Salvador  1978, 1989, 1990, 2003, 2005, 2007   
Guatemala  1981, 1987, 1992-1993, 1994, 1999, 2001   
Honduras  1974-1975, 1978-1981, 1984, 2003-2004, 2007 
Indonesia  1967-1973, 1975,1982-1983, 1986-1987, 1991, 1995 
Morocco 1976-1977,  1981,  1983-1987     
Nicaragua 1988,  1990-1994       
Paraguay 1980-1982,  1986-1987,  1996     
Peru  1973-1977, 1981-1983, 1993, 1995, 1998   
Philippines  1975-1980, 1982-1983, 1990, 1993, 1997   
Sri Lanka  1979-1984, 1986, 1988     
Thailand 1975-1977,1981-1983,  1990-1991,  1995-1996   
Tunisia 1981-1984,  1986,  1993     
Low-income         
Central African Republic  1980, 1982-1984, 1992-1995     
Côte d'Ivoire   1980, 1988-1992       
India 1984,  1987-1990       
Kenya  1980-1981, 1987, 1989, 1995     
Myanmar 1981-1982,  1990-1992,  1998     
Nigeria  1981-1983, 1986, 1993, 2002     
Zambia 1981-1982,  1998,  2000-2001     
Zimbabwe  1981-1982, 1992, 2004- 2005       
Notes: The dates shown are those picked up by the algorithm described 
in the preceding section. Consecutive years (for example, Greece   
2000, 2001) are treated as a single episode.       
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column of this appendix table also provides the dates of sovereign external debt crises 
(defaults or restructuring).
8  For our core sample of 66 countries, which account for about 
90 percent of world GDP, the bonanza dates for 1960 through 2007 are listed in Table 3. 
As the top panel of the figure illustrates, the last major “boom in booms” was the 
early 1980s.  To be more precise, as the core sample reveals for the longer 1960 to 2007 
period, the upswing of this cycle was from 1975 to 1982, or just before the onset of the 
debt crisis of the 1980s.  Prior to 1975, capital flow bonanzas were fewer and further 
between, consistent with the historical evidence presented in Eichengreen and Adalet 
(2005).  Capital flow bonanzas resurfaced in the early 1990s coinciding with a decline in 
U.S. interest rates (see Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, 1993 and Chuhan, Claessens and 
Mamingi, 1998) and the large-scale Brady plan restructuring of emerging market debt.  
This resurgence was modest and occurred in a more selective group of countries—a 
feature well documented by the World Bank (1997).  With Uruguay in 2002 marking the 
last major crisis in emerging markets, bonanzas have re-appeared in force.   The regional 
breakdown indicates that the recipients in this latest wave include countries in Latin 
America, mostly smaller ones benefiting from the commodity-price boom, industrial 
countries where real estate prices had been rising rapidly, and the nations of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, presumably being rewarded for closer 
integration with the European Union.
9   
  Illustrated in the bottom panel of the figure is the well-publicized empirical 
regularity that middle- and high-income countries receive the lion’s share of cross-border 
                                                 
8 The link between capital flow bonanzas and debt crises will be the focus of Section 4. 
9 Discussions of the earlier wave of capital to Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
include Claessens, et al. (1998) and Lankes and Stern (1998), while the more recent experience is covered 
in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).   18
capital flows. This is true by a huge margin when flows are measured in U.S. dollar terms 
and remains so when we calculate the incidence of bonanzas (which scale current account 
deficits by GDP).  Despite the fact that low-income countries account for 28 percent (50 
countries) of the 181 countries in this sample, less than 18 countries have recorded a 
capital bonanza in any given year during the past 30 years or so.  The incidence of capital 
flow bonanzas is far less cyclical for the low-income group.  On the basis of these 
observations, we base our more in-depth analysis of capital flow bonanzas and their link 
to financial crises in the next two sections on a group of 66 countries, of which 58 are 
middle- or high-income.
10 
  The two panels in Figure 3 provide complementary information on the duration of 
bonanzas.  The upper panel plots the maximum duration of bonanzas (in years) by  
countries (rather than episodes).  So, for example, six of the 181 countries never 
experienced a capital inflow bonanza, as they are net capital exporters; this group 
includes Brunei, Luxembourg, Namibia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
Arab Emirates.  For most countries, bonanzas lasted somewhere between two and four 
years, which is perhaps why so many governments (and investors) fall into the all-too-
common trap of treating bonanzas as permanent rather than transitory shocks—an issue 
we take up later when examining the typical fiscal response to the abundance of foreign 
capital.  
Turning now to an analysis of individual episodes, consistent with their cyclical 
nature, three-quarters of the episodes identified during 1980 to 2007 last two years or less.  
Some caution is in order in that there are a large number of instances in which bonanza 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that the middle-income group is comprised of middle-low and middle-high income 
(the latter constitute the largest single group), so our analysis bears on many developing countries beyond 
the largest emerging markets.    19































































Source:  Authors' calculations and data cited in Table 3.   20
episodes are separated by a single year, which de facto makes the bonanza episode much 
longer and adds to the ex-ante confusion as to what is permanent and what is transitory. 
The present US bonanza, which began in 2002 and was into its sixth consecutive year by 
2007, is by no means common, but neither is it unique.  Australia, and the United 
Kingdom, among others, experienced similar long-lived bonanzas in the earlier (1960-
1979) period, as Table 3 makes plain. 
2. The capital flow cycle and world commodity prices 
   Capital inflow surges have often been linked to reductions in international 
interest rates, economic growth in advanced economies, and global commodity price 
booms. 
11  In the remainder of this section, we briefly revisit the well-trodden path of the 
external roots of capital flow bonanzas.  Our primary aim in this paper—beyond 
establishing systematically the dates and incidence of capital inflow bonanzas—is to 
focus on the macroeconomic consequences or developments surrounding capital flows (a 
topic that takes up the next two sections of the paper.  As such, we only provide a mere 
sketch of the links between the bonanza cycle and selected developments in global 
macroeconomic conditions, so as to build on earlier analyses using the most recent data. 
  To this end, we perform two simple exercises.  First, we plot our time series on 
the incidence of bonanzas for the 181-country sample over 1980 through 2007 against: (i) 
real per-capita GDP growth  in the advanced economies, as reported in the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook (upper panel of  Figure 4); and (ii) the IMF’s index of real  
commodity prices,  excluding oil (bottom panel of Figure 4).
12  The evidence presented in 
top panel of Figure 4 is in line with Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), who posit 
                                                 
11 See Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (1996) for a survey of  a literature that flourished in the early 1990s. 
12 As is conventionally done, the nominal commodity price index is deflated by an index of the price of 
manufactures (see, for example Boughton, 1991).   21
that when growth slows in the advanced economies, global capital searches for higher 
yields and profit opportunities abroad in emerging markets—a phenomenon that is well 
underway at the current conjuncture, as discussed in Frankel (2007) in the context of the 
carry trade and its previous incarnations.  The capital flow bonanza-commodity price 
boom link has an old history and some classic episodes of well-managed  (in terms of the 
macroeconomic policy response) and badly-botched varieties make for interesting 
reading in Cuddington (1989) and sources cited therein.  While the earlier 1980s do not 
fit the pattern as neatly, it is important to note that a spectacular boom in commodity 
prices prevailed in the late 1970s when the surge in the incidence of bonanzas began in 
earnest, as shown in the next section.  Beyond the direct positive implications of higher 
commodity prices for export revenues for much of the emerging world, as Frankel (2006 
and 2008a and 2008b) demonstrates, an underlying impetus to world commodity prices is 
low or negative world interest rates, much along the lines of the late 1970s and the last 
few years.  Hence, the effects of lower international interest rates work not only through 
the portfolio channels stressed in Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), but also the 
commodity price channel à la Frankel (2006).  A third, and important link between world 
real interest rates and capital flows to emerging markets comes from the channel stressed 
in Dooley and Fernandez-Arias (1996), who emphasize the benign impacts of low real 
rates on default probabilities.   
Our second empirical exercise is an attempt to explain the share of bonanzas in 
terms of the growth of real GDP in the advanced economies, real commodity prices, and 
the U.S. real short-term interest rate.  We employ the core dataset to capture the 


















































































































interest rates in the United States in the 1970s.  Our dependent variable is contained in a 
limited range, from zero to 100 percent as befits a share of a total.  Accordingly, we 
specify that our independent variables explain the dependent variable by way of a logistic   23
function.  That is, the explanatory variables, along with a vector of ones to capture a 
constant term, are aligned in the vector xt with corresponding coefficients in the vector β 
to obey the functional form, 100·exp(xt β)/[1+exp(xt β)]. 
The coefficients reported in the first column of Table 4 were estimated with a 
maximum likelihood procedure using annual data from 1967 to 2006.  As this is a 
probability forecasting model, the goodness-of-fit measure we rely on chiefly is the 
quadratic probability score (QPS), for the reasons explained in Diebold and Rudebusch 
(1989).   
As anticipated in the figures, the coefficient on commodity prices is positive and 
that on growth is negative; both are statistically significant at the one percent confidence 
level.  The coefficient on the contemporaneous real interest rate, however, does not match 
the intuition provided in Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993).  Their explanation relies 
on the cumulative encouragement to capital flows to the periphery afforded by low 
interest rates at the core.  To match this, the next six columns of the table report estimates 
using successive individual lags of the real rate, from one to six years.  In the event, the 
size of the negative effect of real rates on the share and the significance of that effect, as 
well as the explanatory power of the model, tends to increase as the lag lengthens.   24
 
Table 4.             
Logistic models explaining the probability of a capital flow bonanza   
estimated with annual data from 1967 to 2006         
             
             
    Real short‐term interest rate          
  Constant    Lagged:       
  term  current  1  2  3  4  5  6 
                 
Constant  ‐2.345 ‐ 2.775 ‐ 2.121 ‐ 1.855 ‐ 1.884 ‐ 1.872 ‐ 1.727 ‐ 1.800 
   ‐13.470 ‐ 6.402 ‐ 5.208 ‐ 4.785 ‐ 4.565 ‐ 4.501 ‐ 4.623 ‐ 5.747 
real interest rate    0.129           
     3.006           
       ‐0.049         
       ‐0.960         
         ‐0.138        
         ‐2.708        
           ‐0.103       
           ‐1.942       
             ‐0.108      
             ‐2.006      
              ‐0.147    
              ‐3.033    
               ‐0.199 
               ‐4.730 
real GDP growth   ‐ 0.226 ‐ 0.137 ‐ 0.142 ‐ 0.130 ‐ 0.140 ‐ 0.137 ‐ 0.115 
     ‐3.731 ‐ 2.162 ‐ 2.370 ‐ 2.106 ‐ 2.227 ‐ 2.324 ‐ 2.135 
commodity prices    0.076  0.049  0.042  0.042  0.043  0.039  0.041 
     4.912  3.278  2.920  2.735  2.827  2.867  3.669 
                
                          
Log likelihood 
function  ‐135.3 ‐ 145.2 ‐ 148.9 ‐ 146.1 ‐ 147.4 ‐ 147.4 ‐ 144.8 ‐ 140.0 
R²  0.471  0.440  0.323  0.415  0.372  0.373  0.450  0.568 
QPS  3.060  3.973  4.727  5.619  5.016  4.936  5.149  5.250 
             
Note:  t‐statistics are in italics.           
Source:  Authorsʹ calculations and data cited in Appendix Table 3.     
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4. Do capital flow bonanzas make countries more crisis prone? 
  Are capital flow bonanzas a blessing, a curse, or neutral in making financial crises 
more likely or more severe?  The literature is filled with famous case studies of capital 
flow bonanzas that ended in spectacular crises. The papers range from the infamous 
episodes in the Southern Cone in the late 1970s-early 1980s  (see, for instance, Diaz 
Alejandro’s 1985 classic) to Calvo and Talvi (2005), who place great store in the capital 
flow sudden stop following the Russian 1998 crisis in explaining Argentina’s subsequent 
crash.  Rather than focusing on specific episodes that are either as famous or more 
obscure, we systematically examine the potential links between the likelihood of a capital 
inflow bonanza and financial crises.   Our analysis is conducted on a country-by-country 
basis as well as at the “global” level consistent with the aim of providing an 
encompassing approach.  Our comprehensive database on the dates of bonanza and crises 
episodes allows us to uncover novel results on the systematic connection between the 
incidence of bonanzas and debt, currency, inflation, and banking crises.  Hence, our 
analysis sheds light on the first part of the question of whether financial crises are more 
likely; it remains for future research to investigate issues glimpsed here pertaining to a 
possible link between the order of magnitude of the bonanza and the severity of the crises.  
The latter part of the section is devoted to more general macroeconomic volatility (as 
opposed to crises). 
1. Bonanzas and financial crises: preamble and evidence 
Section 2 delineated the criteria used to define a capital flow bonanza and 
catalogued, country-by-country, all the identified bonanza episodes.  To examine the 
potential links with financial crises of various stripes, we proceed symmetrically.  Our   26
crisis analysis is taken directly from Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).  These crises definitions 
are reproduced in Table 5, while a full listing of dates for sovereign external defaults (or 
restructurings), currency crashes, inflation crises, and banking crises are presented in 
Table 6 for 64 of the 66 core countries, for which we have dates on capital flow  
Table 5. Defining crises by events:  a summary 
 
Type of Crisis 
 







We mark a banking crisis by two types of events: 
(1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or 
takeover by the public sector of one or more 
financial institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, 
the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale 
government assistance of an important financial 
institution (or group of institutions), that marks the 
start of a string of similar outcomes for other 
financial institutions.   
This approach to dating the 
beginning of the banking crises is 
not without drawbacks.  It could 
date the crises too late, because 
the financial problems usually 
begin well before a bank is finally 
closed or merged; it could also 
date the crises too early, because 
the worst of crisis may come 
later.  Unlike external debt crisis 
(see below), which have well-
defined closure dates, it is often 
difficult or impossible to 
accurately pinpoint the year in 




A sovereign default is defined as the failure to meet 
a principal or interest payment on the due date (or 
within the specified grace period).  The episodes 
also include instances where rescheduled debt is 
ultimately extinguished in terms less favorable than 
the original obligation. 
While the time of default is 
accurately classified as a crisis 
year there are a large number of 
cases where the final resolution 
with the creditors (if it ever did 
take place) seems interminable.  
For this reason we also work with 
a crisis dummy that only picks up 
the first year. 
 
Inflation crisis   An annual inflation rate 20 percent or higher. We 
also examine separately the incidence of more 
extreme cases where inflation exceeds 40 percent 
per annum. 
 
All consecutive years where the 
threshold is met or exceded are 




An annual depreciation versus the US dollar (or the 
relevant anchor currency—historically the UK 
pound, the French franc, or the German DM and 
presently the euro) of 15 percent or more. This is 
similar to the Frankel and Rose (1996) approach to 
dating crashes. 
In parallel treatment to the 
inflation crisis dating, all 
consecutive years where the 
threshold is met or exceeded are 
counted as a part of the same 
inflation crisis. 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a). 
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bonanzas.
13 In line with our dating of bonanzas, Table 6 provides beginning and ending 
dates to define each crisis episode. Hence, an entry of a single year denotes that the crises 
only lasted that long. 
 
  From the crises dates shown in Table 6 and the bonanza dates listed in Table 3, 
we constructed a family of country-specific probabilities.  For each of the countries, this 
implies four unconditional crisis probabilities, that of: default (or restructuring) on 
external sovereign debt, a currency crash, an inflation crisis, and a banking crisis.  We 
also construct the probability of each type of crisis within a window of three years before  
                                                 
13 The missing two are Japan and the Netherlands, which are creditor countries.   28
 
and after the bonanza year or years, this we refer to as the conditional probability of a 
crisis.  If capital flow bonanzas make countries more crises prone, the conditional 
probability, P(Crisisi│Bonanza) should be greater than the unconditional probability of a 
crisis, P(Crisisi), where the subscript i refers to the ith “type” of crisis (default, currency, 
etc.).   
Table 7 aggregates these country-specific conditional and unconditional 
probabilities by three groups (all countries, high income, and middle and low income).   29
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is calculated for each pair of probabilities, where n1 = n2  = number of observations in 
each group.  The instances where the difference in proportions is significantly different at 
the one percent confidence level are reported in Table 7 in italics. 
Table 7. Are Bonanza Episodes More Crisis Prone?   
Core sample, 1960-2007   
Probability of crisis  External  Currency  Inflation  Banking   
(in percent)  Default  Crash  Crisis  Crisis   
       
High Income   
Conditional on a bonanza          
(three-year window)  0.2  9.5  2.6  11.9   
Unconditional 0.0  8.2  2.1  11.2   
Difference 0.2  1.3  0.5  0.7   
Middle and low  income   
Conditional on a bonanza         
(three-year window)  29.6  31.5  31.7  20.7   
Unconditional 21.0  22.7  23.5  14.3   
Difference  8.6 8.8  8.2  6.4   
All countries   
Conditional on a bonanza         
(three-year window)  22.2  25.8  24.2  18.4   
Unconditional 15.7  19.1  18.0  13.2   
Difference  6.5 6.7  6.2  5.2   
Percent of countries for which conditional probability is greater than unconditional   
          
 42.2  65.6  59.4  60.9   
          
                
Notes: The three-year window encompasses three years before the bonanza years listed in Table 2, 
the year (or years if these are consecutive) of the bonanza and the three years following the episode.  
Italics denote significance at the one percent confidence level.    
Sources:  Based on Tables 2 and 4 and authors' calculations.     
 
  The main results are summarized as follows.  For the full sample, the probability 
of any of the four varieties of crises conditional on a capital flow bonanza is significantly   30
higher than the unconditional probability.  Put differently, the incidence of a financial 
crisis is higher around a capital inflow bonanza.  However, separating the high income 
countries from the rest qualifies the general result.  As for the high income group, there 
are no systematic differences between the conditional and unconditional probabilities.   
  These results are not entirely surprising as the high income countries do not 
default on their sovereign debts during the sample in question.
14  Given that the threshold 
that defines an inflation crisis is 20 percent per annum, it is also hardly a surprise that this 
cutoff is seldom surpassed by wealthy countries—whether experiencing a capital flow 
bonanza or not.  It is less obvious, a priori, that there is no discernable increase in the 
likelihood of a banking or currency crisis for the advanced economies.  The bottom row 
of Table 7 provides the share of countries for which P(Crisisi│Bonanza) ≥ P(Crisisi) as 
an additional indication of how commonplace is it across countries to see bonanzas 
associated with a more crisis-prone environment.  For sovereign defaults, less than half 
the countries record an increase in default probabilities around capital flow bonanzas.  
(Here, it is important to recall that about one-third of the countries in the core sample are 
high income.)  For currency, banking, and inflation crises, the majority of countries 
register a higher propensity to enter into crisis around bonanza periods. 
  Beyond the aggregate results presented in Table 7, Figures 5 to 8 for debt, 
currency, inflation, and banking crises, respectively, present a comparison of conditional 
and unconditional probabilities for individual countries, where the differences in crisis 
probabilities were greatest.  (Hence, the country list varies across figures).  As noted 
earlier, no high-income country turns up in Figure 5 on debt crises.  The same cannot be 
                                                 
14 There are, however, many instances where the now-advanced economies defaulted in their earlier 
incarnations (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a for a full chronology of these episodes).   31
said of Figures 6 through 8.  While the advanced economies register much lower 
(conditional and unconditional) crisis probabilities than their lower income counterparts, 
the likelihood of crisis is higher around bonanza episodes in several instances.  Notably, 
Finland and Norway record a higher probability of a banking crisis during the vicinity of 
a capital flow bonanza, while Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom show a greater 




Probabilities of External Default: 1960-2007






























Probabilities of a Currency Crash: 1960-2007



































Probabilities of an Inflation Crisis: 1960-2007




































Probabilities of a Banking Crisis: 1960-2007

































2.  Bonanzas as a predictor of sovereign defaults 
  Beyond the country-by-country comparisons described in the preceding section, 
we wanted to refine further the relationship between bonanzas and sovereign defaults.  As 
discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a) in the context of the evidence from 1800 to 
2007, there is an intimate connection between the global capital flows (as measured 
annually in terms of U.S. dollars) and default (exactly as measured here, by the incidence 
of sovereign default).  A variant of this relationship is presented in Figure 9, which plots 
the annual incidence of capital flow bonanzas during 1960-2007 for the core sample and    35
Figure 9.  Capital flow bonanzas as predictors of sovereign default: 
66 countries, 1960‐2007 
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the comparable incidence on sovereign default.  The overall incidence is higher and more 
variable than that shown in Figure 1 for the 181 countries, as the core sample 
predominantly represents countries that have access to international capital markets and, 
in particular, private flows.  A cursory inspection of this figure is suggestive that the 
incidence of bonanzas possibly “leads” the incidence of default.  This temporal pattern 
would seem plausible in light of the fact that capital inflows to developing countries have   36
historically been predominantly debt-creating flows.
15  As the bonanza continues, 
leverage (usually public and private) increases.
16 
  To investigate this possibility formally, we ran a series of logistic regressions 
where the dependent variable is the aggregate or global probability of sovereign default 
against the aggregate or global probability of a capital flow bonanza, either 
contemporaneous or lagged anywhere between one year and six years.  As in the prior 
section, this functional form respects the limited range of the dependent variable.  These 
results are summarized in Table 8 along the column headings for lags up to six years.  As 
the results indicate, the fit of regression improves steadily as the lag length is extended up 
to six years.  The single bonanza regressor is statistically significant at the one percent 
level for the regressions where the t-statistics appear in italics.  The preferred 
specification (six lags) yields an R
2 of about 0.50.  Similarly, the QPS statistic falls.  As 
in the previous discussion on determinants, the global factors behind bonanzas, this 
exercise is meant to be illustrative rather than a self-contained model of sovereign default. 
It is worth mentioning that this external default time series registers a contemporaneous 
correlation with world real interest rates of 0.59, underscoring that there are multiple 
factors beyond bonanzas that determine the likelihood of a sovereign debt crises.  These 
results would not be unfamiliar to the reader on Mendoza and Terrones (2008), who 
conclude that not all credit booms end in financial crises, but most emerging markets 
crises were associated with credit booms.
                                                 
15 It is important to reiterate that the incidence of sovereign default during the period in question owes to 
emerging markets. 
16 On the basis of the historical track record, it is plausible to expect a higher chance of a sovereign default 
after a bonanza even in cases where government debt is not increasing. This is because the government 
sooner or later has usually ended up guaranteeing private sector debts.   37
 
Table 8.            
Logistic models explaining the probability of default     
estimated with annual data from 1967 to 2006         
            
             
    Share of countries with capital flow bonanzas    
  Constant  Lagged:        
  term  current  1  2  3  4  5  6 
              
constant  ‐1.637 ‐ 1.526 ‐ 1.778 ‐ 1.989 ‐ 2.093 ‐ 2.211 ‐ 2.323  ‐2.345 
   ‐14.2 ‐ 6.5 ‐ 7.7 ‐ 9.0 ‐ 10.0 ‐ 11.1 ‐ 12.6  ‐13.5 
              
Bonanza    ‐0.005          
     ‐0.5          
      0.007        
       0.7        
         0.016       
         2.1       
           0.021      
           3.0      
            0.027      
            4.1      
             0.031    
             5.4    
              0.033 
                        6.0 
Log likelihood 
function  ‐148.1 ‐ 147.9 ‐ 147.8 ‐ 146.2 ‐ 144.3 ‐ 141.4 ‐ 137.4  ‐135.3 
R²  0.000  0.008  0.014  0.091  0.173  0.284  0.413  0.471 
QPS  1.921  1.906  1.895  1.747  1.589  1.375  1.129  1.018 
            
            
Note:  t‐statistics are in italics.           
Source:  Authorsʹ calculations and data cited in Appendix Table 3.     
 
3. Bonanzas and macroeconomic volatility 
  Crises, like bonanzas, are discrete, traumatic, and (in the more stable countries) 
relatively rare.  Yet another possibility where capital flow bonanzas would be less than a   38
blessing might be if these bouts of capital inflows lead to an overall increase in 
macroeconomic volatility, even if it did not increase the odds of a financial crisis outright.  
To shed some light on this issue, we performed some simple exercises involving the 
volatilities of real GDP growth, consumer price inflation, and the current account-GDP 
ratio.  Needless to say, this only skims the surface of the potential links between 
bonanzas and macroeconomic volatility.   
  We measure volatility as the 66
th percentile of the absolute annual change in each  
macroeconomic variable.  Table 9 reports for the full sample the simple pairwise 
correlations between the incidence of capital inflow bonanzas from 1981 to 2007 and the 
volatility (as described above) of real GDP growth, inflation, and the current account to 
GDP. For all three variables the correlation is positive (ranging from a low of 0.25 fo 
inflation to a high of 0.43 for real GDP growth) and statistically significant.  Of course, 
this exercise does not speak of causality or how representative this “global” bonanza-
volatility link plays out for individual countries.   
 
Table 9.  Incidence of Bonanzas and Volatility:  
181 Countries, 1980-2007 
 
 
Correlation of the incidence of bonanzas with the volatility of: 
 
 




Current account to GDP  0.39 
  
 
Notes: We measure volatility as the 66
th percentile of the absolute annual change in each macroeconomic 
variable.  
Sources: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations. 
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5.  Anatomy of Bonanza Episodes 
  The macroeconomic developments associated with surges in capital inflows are a 
mixture of anecdotal evidence from case studies and more systematic analyses which (to 
our  knowledge) have no standardized definition of “a capital inflow episode” or 
bonanza.
17  The collective evidence from this literature suggests that capital inflows are 
most often associated with both a deterioration in the current account and an 
accumulation in international reserves, ostensibly from the central bank’s persistent 
efforts to avoid or mitigate the tendency towards a nominal and real exchange rate 
appreciation that usually goes hand-in-hand with the capital inflow.
18 As Calvo, 
Leiderman,and Reinhart (1993) document in several papers, the pressures for the 
exchange rate to appreciate stem both from an increased demand for the local assets 
(which may or may not lead to an asset price boom or bubble) as well as from an increase 
in aggregate demand for both traded and nontraded goods.  As long as the supply of the 
nontraded good is not perfectly elastic, the relative price of nontradeables increase (i.e., a 
real exchange rate appreciation).   
In an attempt to analyze the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in advanced and 
emerging market economies, Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) present evidence for 
emerging markets of the “when it rains, it pours” phenomenon; that is to say that the 
cyclical components of GDP, net capital flows and real fiscal spending all reinforce each 
other.  Periods of cyclically high capital inflows are associated with an expansion in real 
government spending—fiscal policy is procyclical both in relation to output and capital 
inflows. 
                                                 
17 See Reinhart and Reinhart (1998) for a discussion of the stylized facts and the references cited therein. 
18 See Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) for evidence of fear of floating or, in the recent context, fear of an 
appreciation.   40
Some of these macroeconomic trends, notably the worsening current account, 
appreciating real exchange rates, and rising asset prices, regularly present themselves on 
the eve of currency and banking crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) and sudden stops 
(Edwards, 2004 and 2007).  In the remainder of this section, we extend such comparisons. 
1. Growth, inflation, and the current account 
  Capital flow bonanzas—as with sudden stops, current account reversals, and 
financial crises—each have their own idiosyncrasies.  However, these episodes also tend 
to share common threads that cut across time and national boundaries, which we exploit 
by opening a wide window of comparison. 
Our strategy is to examine the behavior of key macroeconomic and financial 
indicators in the run-up and aftermath of the identified bonanza episodes, starting with 
the “big picture.”  Figure 10 presents four panels showing medians across episodes 
during 1980 to 2007 for key macroeconomic indicators:  real GDP growth, inflation, the 
current account balance-to-GDP, and the real exchange rate.  We plot each series from 
four years (-4) before the bonanza (year 0) to four years (4) after.  Because of the 
enormous diversity in our 181-country sample, the medians are plotted separately for 
high-, middle-, and low-income countries (denoted by a solid, dashed, and dotted lines, 
respectively).   In line with the findings of several papers on capital account reversals and 
sudden stops, the average path of the current account balance to GDP (top right panel) is 





improving steadily thereafter.  Note that this is not an artifact of our selection criteria.  
We do not select for big changes, only big levels.  Current account deficits are, on 
average, largest for the low-income countries and smallest for the advanced economies, 
consistent with the evidence reported earlier on cut-off values.  The path of the real   42
exchange rate (bottom left panel) shows that there is a cumulative appreciation (a decline 
denotes an appreciation) up to the bonanza year and a sharp depreciation afterwards.  The 
analysis of Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) presents compelling evidence that in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, the cumulative real appreciation unwinds through a 
swift nominal depreciation (perhaps through a full-fledged currency crisis) rather than 
through a downward adjustment in prices. 
GDP growth rises into the bonanza but then slows, settling back to a roughly pre-
bonanza growth rate for middle- and low-income countries and a markedly lower growth 
rate for high-income economies.  As to inflation, the trajectory is so diverse across the 
three income groups that it is impossible to draw any conclusion as to a fixed behavioral 
pattern.  This suggests that the efforts of central banks in anchoring expectations are more 
important than the stage of the capital-flow cycle.   
This association holds across individual countries as well.  Figure 11 provides 
reinforcing cross-episode evidence via scatter plots that compare the real GDP growth 
and inflation performance for the year before and after the bonanza.  Observations above 
the 45 degree ray indicate that growth (inflation) is higher one year after the bonanza than 
the year before the bonanza episode; the converse is true for observations below the 
diagonal.  Taken together these scatter plots confirm that for the most part (63 percent of 
the episodes) growth is lower after the capital inflow boom, while no clear pattern 






The narrative illustrated in Figure 12 for the core 66 countries for the longer 
sample spanning 1960 through 2007 intimately mirrors the broader post-1980 experience; 
the current account registers a V-shaped pattern, inflation is markedly different for the 





bonanza but does worse in the aftermath—particularly for high-income countries.  
Whatever growth benefits accrue during the bonanza phase are but short-lived. 
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2. External sector:  Reserves, exchange rates, and trade 
There is a blossoming recent literature trying to explain why many emerging 
market countries have been amassing international reserves at an unprecedented clip.  
Some studies have stressed a “precautionary” motive in which countries build their war 
chests in good times to provide liquidity if need be in bad times.
19  What the upper panel 
of Figure 13 makes plain is that the practice of accumulating reserves, especially in 
developing countries during capital inflow years (which characterizes the current juncture 
for many emerging markets) is far from new, as the episodes depicted in this figure span 
1960 to the present.  Reluctance to allow for a sustained nominal or real exchange rate 
appreciation is a constant that has withstood the test of time in emerging markets.  
Tendencies to lean against the wind are seldom more pronounced than when there is a 
capital inflow bonanza underway. The forty-percent-plus increase in reserves in the run-
up to the bonanza is no trivial change for the middle and low income countries, who as of 
2007 held about twice as much in reserves as their high-income counterparts (bottom 
panel). 
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There is little surprising in Figure 14, which displays the same graphs for the 
external indicators (trade balance, exports, imports, and real exchange rate) for the 66-
country sample.  The trade balance follows the same path of the current account, as 
imports expand more rapidly than exports at the outset of the bonanza.  The real 
exchange rate initially appreciates and subsequently depreciates in the years immediately 
following the capital flow bonanza.  The only incremental evidence revealed by 
Figure 14 is that the real depreciation shown in the bottom right panel is noticeably 
smoother than that shown in Figure 9 for the 181 country average post-1980; possibly, 
this difference may reflect that crises are more severe (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) and 
reversals more acute (Eichengreen and Adalet, 2005) in the more recent period or that the 
addition of lower-income countries in the larger sample adds to volatility. 
3. Fiscal policy: amplifier or stabilizer 
  Managing surges in capital inflows poses nontrivial policy challenges, particularly 
if the inflows are persistent and/or if the orders of magnitude are staggering; these policy 
challenges are discussed in detail and examples provided in Reinhart and Reinhart (1998).  
Policy responses can mitigate the down-side of capital flow bonanzas (recall the main 
conclusion from the preceding section is that bonanzas are historically associated with 
higher odds of a financial crises) or amplify their more worrisome tendencies.  The 
mismanagement of capital flow bonanza-commodity price boom episodes (see 
Cuddington, 1989) more often than not has its roots in the authorities’ premise that the 
“good times” are permanent and, as such, can fully support a full-fledged expansion in 
real fiscal spending.  This is the essence of fiscal procyclicality as documented by Gavin 





  Figure 15 presents, in a comparable format, the evolution of real government 
spending and revenues and the fiscal balance (all indexed to the level four years prior to 
the bonanza).  The deeply entrenched pattern of procyclical fiscal behavior by middle and 
low income countries emerges unambiguously from the three panels that make up the 
figure.   Government spending from two years prior to the year of the bonanza rises by 
about 20 percent in real terms at a time during which growth is accelerating, as discussed.  
Despite even faster growth in government revenues (than in expenditures), the fiscal 
balance deteriorates markedly into the bonanza year.  (This deterioration materializes  




because, while revenues are growing more rapidly, they are doing so from a lower base 
than expenditures four years prior to the bonanza.)  The lax expenditure during the boom 
phase (and the associated deterioration in the fiscal balance) sets the stage for a “non-
voluntary” fiscal tightening when the economic downturn sets in.  Hence, as KRV (2004) 
illustrate, the magnitude of the swing in real fiscal spending during the cycle from boom 
to bust can be as large as 25 to 35 percentage points (as in the case of Uganda and Liberia, 
respectively.)
20   
                                                 
20 To be clear, the amplitude of the swing is calculated as the percent growth in real government spending 
during an expansion minus the growth in government spending in downturns.  In the case of an extremely 
procyclical government, real spending would grow during good times (as shown in Figure 15), perhaps by   50
KRV rank the government’s procyclicality propensity by two measures: the 
correlation between the cyclical component of real GDP and real fiscal spending (if 
positive, it implies procyclicality) and the amplitude of the swing in real spending (as 
described).  Using these two indicators, we conducted a simple exercise to shed light on 
the plausible conjecture that the procyclical nature of government spending may help 
explain why the odds of a financial crisis increase around capital flow bonanzas, as 
illustrated in the preceding section.  On a cross-country basis, we correlated the 
difference between the conditional, P(Crisisi│Bonanza),  and unconditional probability, 
P(Crisisi)  for each of the four types of crises (as shown for selected countries in Figures 
4-8) and the two KRV measures of fiscal procyclicality (one at a time).  The eight 
correlations were positive ranging from 0.25 to 0.46; six of the correlations were 
statistically significant. The results of these preliminary exercises are, thus, consistent 
with our conjecture about the destabilizing role of fiscal policy around capital flow 
bonanzas—and possibly more generally. 
4. Asset markets 
  The last indicators we examine around bonanza periods are asset prices, 
specifically, real equity prices for the 66-country sample and real house prices for a 
subset of 18 high income countries for the period from 1970 through 2007.  There has 
been discussion and some anecdotal evidence to suggest that asset prices boom during 
some famous capital inflow bonanzas (as in Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2003).  Such a 
phenomenon appears reasonable, as a capital inflow represents an increased demand (by 
the rest of the world) for a particular country’s assets, which would include equity and 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 percent; and in downturns it would contract by about 10 percent.  Thus the amplitude of the swing 
during the business cycle would be 25 percent.   51
real estate.  As to asset prices and crises, one cannot read Kindelberger (1989) without 
drawing a tight link between the two.     
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) present evidence to suggest that equity price 
bubbles are systematically present in the eve of banking crises—indeed, they are a good 
leading indicator of these.  Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) present evidence that real house 
prices boomed on the eve of the worst post-World War II banking crises in emerging 
market economies. 
  Figures 16 and 17 suggest a three-way link between capital inflow bonanzas, asset 
price booms, and financial crises.  For both asset markets (for equities in Figure 16 and 
houses in Figure 17), there is a marked rise in inflation-adjusted prices that peaks at the 
time of the bonanza and is followed by a sustained decline during the four years 
following the bonanza.  Taking together the evidence on the higher likelihood of a 
sovereign default in particular (and other types of financial crises in general), the 
slowdown in real GDP growth, and the protracted decline in asset values following the 
capital bonanza, the swift corrections in the twin deficits (current account and fiscal) 
observed after the bonanza may likely be a matter of necessity rather than choice.   52
Figure 16.  Equity prices and bonanzas: 66 countries, 1960‐2007 
 





  Conversations revolving around international financial adjustment sometimes 
have an aspect similar to the climactic scene in a few Hollywood crime movies in which 
the villain lures the hero in a hall of mirrors.  It is not clear which is the originating action 
and which is the reflection, so that left can be right, or right left.  Invariably, the initial 
target turns out to be glass.  In international finance, one country’s current account 
surplus can correspond to many countries’ deficits, and a surplus is mirrored in a deficit 
in the capital account.  As a consequence, the considerable literature on international 
adjustment overlaps to a significant degree, even though the studies adopt different 
selection criteria for what constitutes an event. 
We have adopted a back-to-basics approach toward understanding some of the 
features of episodes of heavy capital inflows which, given double-entry bookkeeping, has 
usually meant periods of large current account deficits by historical standards.  By 
focusing squarely on the perspective of the recipient of capital inflows (wherever or 
however poor or wealthy that country may be), our analysis does not extend to issues 
pertaining to lending countries or the broader and currently popular discussion of global 
imbalances.  Nearly all the areas we have touched upon, both as to the causes and 
consequences of the bonanzas, merit further scrutiny, particularly as relates to the links 
between asset prices, bubbles, crises, and capital flows.   
As to the policy responses to capital inflow bonanzas, our analysis has been silent 
in all dimensions but one.  Namely, we present evidence on the infamously procyclical 
and destabilizing reaction of fiscal policy (specifically government spending) to the   55
capital flow bonanza in nearly all but the high income countries.
21  The expansionary 
fiscal policy unfolds against a backdrop of higher growth in output and government 
revenues associated with the bonanza.  It is not unreasonable to conjecture that these 
government spending practices in “good times” set the stage for a multi-decade pattern of 
serial default.   
During the past few years, international interest rates have remained low (by 
historical standards), and real interest rates have turned negative on a sustained basis for 
the first time since the late 1970s.  Commodity prices have surged.   Once again, 
investors in the financial centers of the world and elsewhere are tripping over themselves 
in the eternal quest for higher yields in emerging markets and other higher-risk 
investments.  From an emerging market perspective, the external scenario of the past few 
years can be best characterized as “benign.”  Yet, as of 2007, 85 percent of countries in 
our core sample have recorded increases in real government expenditures.  Perhaps once 
again, authorities view the favorable global environment as permanent).  Fully two-thirds 
of the 181 countries covered in the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook recorded 
higher inflation in 2007 than in 2006, and an equal share recorded even higher inflation 
on a year-end basis in 2007 than on a year-average basis—pointing to even higher 
readings for 2008.  If this is what is to be expected in good times, where capital bonanzas 
are plentiful, it is perhaps time to start re-reading Kindleberger. 
                                                 
21 It is important to recall that there is a positive association between the degree of fiscal procyclicality and 
the incremental odds of a financial crisis around capital flow bonanzas.   56
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 Indonesia  Russia  Japan 
 Morocco  South  Africa  Korea 
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 Paraguay  Uruguay  New  Zealand 
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     United  Kingdom 
     United  States 
 
Note: Income classification from the World Bank. Number of countries in each category shown in 
parentheses. 
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Afghanistan, Rep. of.  Albania  Argentina  Bahamas, The 
Bangladesh Algeria  Belize  Bahrain 
Benin Angola Botswana Barbados 
Burkina Faso  Armenia  Brazil  Belgium 
Burundi Azerbaijan  Bulgaria Brunei  Darussalam 
C⌠te d'Ivoire  Belarus  Chile  Canada 
Cambodia Bhutan  Costa  Rica  Cyprus 
Central African Republic  Bolivia Croatia  Czech  Republic 
Chad Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  Dominica  Denmark 
Comoros Cameroon Equatorial Guinea  Estonia 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of  Cape Verde  Gabon  Finland 
Eritrea China  Grenada  France 
Ethiopia Colombia Hungary  Germany 
Gambia, The  Congo, Republic of  Kazakhstan  Greece 
Ghana Djibouti  Latvia  Hong  Kong  SAR 
Guinea Dominican  Republic  Lebanon  Iceland 
Guinea-Bissau Ecuador  Libya  Ireland 
Haiti Egypt Lithuania  Israel 
India El  Salvador  Malaysia  Italy 
Kyrgyz Republic  Fiji  Mauritius  Japan 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic Georgia  Mexico  Korea 
Liberia Guatemala  Montenegro, Republic of  Kuwait 
Madagascar Guyana  Oman  Luxembourg 
Malawi Honduras  Panama  Malta 
Mali Indonesia  Poland  Netherlands 
Mauritania  Iran, Islamic Republic of  Romania  New Zealand 
Mongolia Jamaica  Russia  Norway 
Mozambique Jordan  Serbia  Portugal 
Myanmar Kenya  Seychelles  Qatar 
Nepal  Kiribati  Slovak Republic  Saudi Arabia 
Niger Lesotho  South  Africa  Singapore 
Nigeria 
Macedonia, Former 
Yugoslav Republic of  St. Kitts and Nevis  Slovenia 
Pakistan Maldives St.  Lucia  Spain 
Papua New Guinea  Moldova 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines Sweden 
Rwanda Morocco Turkey Switzerland 
Senegal  Namibia  Uruguay  Taiwan Province of China 
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Sierra Leone  Nicaragua  Venezuela  Trinidad and Tobago 
Solomon Islands  Paraguay    United Arab Emirates 
Sudan Peru    United  Kingdom 
Sπo TomΘ and Prφncipe Philippines    United  States 
Tajikistan Samoa     
Tanzania Sri  Lanka    
Timor Suriname     
Togo Swaziland     
Uganda Syrian  Arab  Republic     
Uzbekistan Thailand     
Vietnam Tonga     
Yemen, Republic of  Tunisia     
Zambia Turkmenistan     
Zimbabwe Ukraine     
 Vanuatu     
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GDP, IMF World Economic Outlook  Billions 
Nominal GDP   
Real GDP   
External accounts, IMF World Economic Outlook  Billions of US dollars 
Total capital flows, net   
Current account balance   
Financial account balance   
Trade balance   
Foreign reserves   
Imports of goods and services   
Exports of goods and services   
Prices   
Consumer price index,, IMF World Economic Outlook Indices 
Inflation Percent 
Equity prices, IMF International Financial Statistics  Indices 
House prices, Bank for International Settlements  Indices 
Exchange rate, International Financial Statistics  National currency per U.S. 
dollar 
Fiscal and national accounts, IMF World Economic Outlook  and 
Government Financial Statistics 
Billions of national currency 
Central government balance   
Central government expenditure   
Central government revenue   
Other variables   
Crises indicators, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)  Indices 
Commodity prices, Boughton (1991) and IMF World Economic Outlook Index 
Short-term interest rates, Source OECD and IMF International Financial 
Statistics 
Percent 





Australia 1986, 1989, 2004-2005, 2007






Germany 1980, 1991, 1994-1995, 1999-2000
Greece 1983, 1985, 2000, 2006-2007
Iceland 1982, 2000, 2004-2007
Ireland 1980-1984, 2007
Italy 1980-1982, 1991-1992
Korea 1980-1983, 1991, 1996 1998*
New Zealand 1982, 1984-1985, 2005-2007
Norway 1986-1989, 1998
Portugal 1981-1982, 2000-2001, 2005
Spain 2000, 2004-2007
Sweden 1980-1982, 1990-1992
United Kingdom 1988-1990, 2005-2007
United States 2002-2007
High-income non-OECD
Antigua and Barbuda 1981-1982, 1986-1989 1996-2006
Bahamas, The 1997-1998, 2005-2007
Bahrain 1987, 1989, 1991-1993, 1998
Barbados 1981, 2004-2007
Cyprus 1980, 1983-1984, 1991-1992
Czech Republic 1996-1997, 2001-2004
Estonia 2004, 2006-2007
Georgia 1994-1995, 2007
Hong Kong SAR 1980-1981, 1994-1997
Israel 1981-1984, 1995-1996
Kuwait 1993, 1995-1996, 1998
Malta 1995-1996, 2000
Qatar 1992, 2004-2007
Saudi Arabia 1983-1984, 1986, 1991-1993
Singapore 1980-1984, 1987
Slovenia 1999, 2006-2007
Trinidad and Tobago 1982-1984, 1986, 1997-1998 1988-1989
Appendix Table 4. Dates of Capital Flow Bonanza and External Debt Crises:
Extended sample, high income, 1980-2007
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Country Years of external default
 
Middle- income, high
Argentina 1982, 1987, 1994, 1997-1999 1982-1993, 2001-2005
Belize 2000-2005
Botswana 1980-1984, 1990
Brazil 1980-1983, 1999, 2001 1983-1994
Bulgaria 1990-1993, 2005-2007 1990-1994
Chile 1980-1982, 1984-1986, 1983-1990
Costa Rica 1980-1983, 1989-1990 1981-1990
Croatia 1997, 2002, 2007 1992-1996
Dominica 1980-1981, 1989-1990, 2005 2003-2005
Equatorial Guinea 1980-1982, 1995-1996, 1998
Gabon 1986-1989, 1992, 1998 1986-1994, 1999-2004
Grenada 2001-2003, 2006-2007
Hungary 1986-1987, 1993-1994, 1998-1999, 2003-2004
Latvia 2004, 2006-2007
Lebanon 1983, 1990-1992, 1997-1998
Malaysia 1981-1983, 1991, 1994-1995
Mauritius 1980-1982, 2006-2007
Mexico 1980-1981, 1991-1994 1982-1990, 1995*
Oman 1986, 1992-1995, 1998
Panama 1980-1982, 1997-1998, 2007 1983-1996
Poland 1980-1981, 1985-1989 1981-1994
Romania 1992, 2004-2007 1981-1983, 1986
Russia 1992, 1997
Serbia 2007 1992-2004
Seychelles 1982, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 2000-2002
Slovak Republic 1996-1998
South Africa 1981-1982, 2005-2007 1985-1987, 1989, 1993
St. Kitts and Nevis 1989, 2001-2003, 2007
St. Lucia 1980, 1983, 2003, 2006-2007
St. Vincent and the Grenadines1997-1998, 2004, 2006-2007
Turkey 1980, 2000, 2004-2007 1982
Uruguay 1980-1984, 2001
Venezuela 1982, 1987-1988, 1992-1993, 1998 1983-1988, 1990, 1995-1997, 2004-200
Appendix Table 4. Dates of Capital Flow Bonanza and External Debt Crises:
Extended sample, middle-high income, 1980-2007
Years of Bonanzas  67
Country Years of external default
 
Middle-income, low
Albania 1991-1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 1991-1995
Algeria 1969, 1973, 1975-1979, 1986, 1988-1989, 1994-1995, 1998 1991-1996
Angola 1982, 1995, 1997-1999, 2001 1985-2003
Armenia 1992, 1996-1998
Azerbaijan 1996, 1998, 2003-2004
Bhutan 1982-1987
Bolivia 1981, 1985-1987, 1993, 1998 1980-1984, 1986-1997
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003, 2005 1992-1997
Cameroon 1980-1981, 1987-1988, 1993, 2002 1987-2003
Cape Verde 1980-1981, 1999, 2003-2004 1981-1996
China 1985-1986, 1988-1989, 1993
Colombia 1982-1983, 1995, 1997-1998  
Congo, Republic of 1994-1996, 1998-1999, 2007 1983-2007
Djibouti 2000, 2006-2007
Dominican Republic 1980-1982, 1987 1982-1994, 2005
Ecuador 1981-1982, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1998 1982-1995, 1999-2000
Egypt 1981-1985, 1998
El Salvador 1989, 1990, 2003, 2005, 2007  
Fiji 1981, 2004-2007
Guatemala 1981, 1987, 1992-1993, 1994, 1999, 2001 1986, 1989
Guyana 1980-1983, 1985-1986 1982-1986
Honduras 1980-1981, 1984, 2003-2004, 2007 1981-2007
Indonesia 1982-1983, 1986-1987, 1991, 1995 1998-2000, 2002
Iran, Islamic Republic of 1980-1981, 1986, 1991-1993 1980-1995
Jamaica 1981-1982, 1985, 2007-2007 1981-1985, 1987-1993
Jordan 1990-1992, 2005, 2007 1989-1993
Kiribati 1992, 1996, 2005-2007
Lesotho 1991-1993, 1996-1998
Macedonia 1994, 1997-1998, 2002 1983-1999
Maldives 1980, 1993, 2005-2007
Moldova 1993, 1997-1998, 2006 1998, 2002
Morocco  1981, 1983-1987 1983, 1986-1990
Nicaragua 1988, 1990-1994
Paraguay 1980-1982, 1986-1987, 1996 1986-1992, 2003-2004
Peru 1981-1983, 1993, 1995, 1998 1980, 1983-1997
Philippines 1980, 1982-1983, 1990, 1993, 1997 1983-1992
Samoa 1980-1981, 1991-1993, 2003
Sri Lanka 1979-1984, 1986, 1988 1981-1983
Suriname 1983, 1991, 1998-1999, 2001, 2003
Swaziland 1980-1985
Syrian Arab Republic 1980, 1983, 1994, 2006-2007
Thailand 1981-1983, 1990-1991, 1995-1996
Tonga 1990-1991, 1994-1995, 1998
Tunisia 1981-1984, 1986, 1993 1980-1982
Turkmenistan 1995, 1997-1999
Ukraine 1994-1995, 2007 1998-2000
Vanuatu 2002-2003, 2005-2007
Years of Bonanzas
Appendix Table 4. Dates of Capital Flow Bonanza and External Debt Crises:
Extended sample, middle-low income, 1980-2007
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Low-income
Benin 1981-1983, 1988, 2002-2003
Burkina Faso 1999-2001, 2004-2005 1987-1996
Burundi 1982-1983, 1987, 1990, 2006-2007
Cambodia 1988-1989, 1996, 1998
Central African Republic 1980, 1982-1984, 1992-1995 1981, 1983-2007
Chad 1986, 2000-2004
Comoros 1984-1985, 1987, 1994, 1997
Congo, Democratic Republic o 1987, 1989, 1991-1992, 2005 1980-2007
Côte d'Ivoire 1980, 1988-1992 1983-1998, 2000-2007
Ethiopia 1999, 2002, 2005-2007 1991-1999
Gambia, The 1980-1981, 1996, 2005 1986-1990
Ghana 1993, 1997, 1999, 2006-2007 1968, 1970, 1974, 1987
Guinea 1988-1990, 1996, 2007 1985-1988, 1991-1998
Haiti 1980-1981, 1990-1993 1982-1999
India 1984, 1987-1990
Kenya 1980-1981, 1987, 1989, 1995 1994-1998, 2000
Lao People's Democratic Repub1988-1989, 2004-2005, 2007
Madagascar 1980-1981, 1990, 2005, 2007 1981-2002
Malawi 1980, 1992, 1994, 1997, 2002, 2005 1982, 1988
Mali 1980, 1996, 1999-2001, 2004
Mauritania 1980-1983, 2004-2005 1992-1996
Mongolia 1998, 2002-2003
Mozambique 1987-1989, 1993-1995 1983-1992
Myanmar 1981-1982, 1990-1992, 1998 2002-2007
Nepal 1982-1984, 1989-1991
Niger 1980-1982, 2005-2006 1982-1991
Nigeria 1981-1983, 1986, 1993, 2002 1987-1994, 2004-2005
Pakistan 1993, 1996-1997, 2007-2007 1981, 1998-1999
Papua New Guinea 1980-1984, 1997
Rwanda 1991-1993, 1997-1998
São Tomé and Príncipe 1982, 1991-1992, 2007-2007 1987-1994
Senegal 1980-1984 1981-1985, 1990, 1992-1996
Sierra Leone 1980-1982, 1990-1991, 1996 1983-1984, 1986-1996
Solomon Islands 1985, 1991, 2005-2007
Sudan 1981-1982, 1992-1995 1980-2007
Tanzania 1994-1995, 1998-1999 1980, 1982-1984, 1988, 1991-1997
Togo 1980 ,1982-1983, 1987 1980-1993
Uganda 1991, 1993, 1998-2001 1981, 1985-1993
Vietnam 1993-1996, 2007 1985-1998
Zambia 1981-1982, 1998, 2000-2001 1983-1994
Zimbabwe 1981-1982, 1992, 2004- 2005 2000-2007
Appendix Table  4. Dates of Capital Flow Bonanza and External Debt Crises:
Extended sample, low income, 1980-2007
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 